[//]: # (werk v2)
# Use correct filter for virtual host tree links
key | value
---------- | ---
compatible | yes
version | 2.4.0b1
date | 2024-06-25T13:24:05+00:00
level | 1
class | fix
component | multisite
edition | cre
Since 2.2.0 the virtual host tree links for "Show the service problems
contained in this branch" missed the filters for "service states"
(WARN/CRIT/UNKN) and "downtimes" (no).
[//]: # (werk v2)
# Synthetic Monitoring: Privilege Escalation
key | value
---------- | ---
date | 2024-06-24T14:56:31+00:00
version | 2.4.0b1
class | security
edition | cee
component | agents
level | 1
compatible | yes
The Robotmk scheduler was affected by a privilege escalation issue. This issue affects users, which
have configured the rule `Robotmk scheduler (Windows)`. Specifically, an attacker is able to exploit
the issue, if
1. `Automated environment setup (via RCC)` was configured in the `Robotmk scheduler (Windows)` rule,
2. the same plan was configured without configuring `Execute plan as a specific user`
3. and a user on the host, onto which the scheduler has been deployed, was compromised.
In this event, the attacker could gain SYSTEM privileges on the host. If `Execute plan as a specific
user` _is_ configured, then the attacker could compromise that specific user, rather than SYSTEM.
There is a second similar, but distinct issue. If
- there are two or more plans configured with `Execute plan as a specific user` with distinct users
- and one of the configured users was already compromised.
The attacker could then compromise the other user.
*Background*:
The Robotmk scheduler is started by the Checkmk agent that runs with SYSTEM privileges.
Moreover, Robotmk allows the user to automatically build Python environments via RCC. During setup
the scheduler would enable a RCC feature called `shared holotree usage`. This feature allows all
users on the host to edit these Python environments. Thus, any compromised user on the host is also
able to compromise a user, which executes code from these shared environments.
With this Werk, `shared holotree usage` will no longer be enabled. Affected users will have their
access to the vunerable Python environments revoked. Moreover, the permissions inside of the working
directory of Robotmk have been reworked. Users now only have access to directories, which are
required for their own executions.
Note, you must update both Checkmk and redeploy the latest Robotmk Scheduler.
*Affected Versions*:
* 2.3.0
*Mitigations*:
If updating is not possible:
* Do not use the rule `Automated environment setup (via RCC)`.
* Always use the same user for `Execute plan as a specific user`.
*Vulnerability Management*:
We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of 7.8 (High) with the following CVSS vector:
`CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` and requested a CVE.
[//]: # (werk v2)
# Synthetic Monitoring: Report RCC Profile Configuration Errors
key | value
---------- | ---
date | 2024-06-24T14:12:42+00:00
version | 2.4.0b1
class | fix
edition | cee
component | checks
level | 1
compatible | yes
If the Robotmk Scheduler encounters an error while applying the RCC configuration, then
corresponding RCC plans will be skipped. This in turn affects discovered services in Checkmk. With
this Werk the check `robotmk_scheduler_status` will go CRIT and report the error.
Werk 17056 was adapted. The following is the new Werk, a diff is shown at the end of the message.
Title: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830)
Class: security
Compatible: incomp
Component: wato
Date: 1718799000
Edition: cre
Level: 2
Version: 2.1.0p45
By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal
monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log.
Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log.
This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of
automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of
the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface.
Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically
during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in
the log (see next paragraph for details).
A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is
copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong
during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log
and remove the automation secrets manually by running
```
sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
```
If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files.
In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation
secrets are replaced during the update of each site.
In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no
automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only
information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a
replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be
present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well,
the steps described before also apply.
<em>Affected Versions</em>:
LI: 2.3.0
LI: 2.2.0
LI: 2.1.0
LI: 2.0.0 (EOL)
<em>Mitigations</em>:
Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in
~var/check_mk/wato/log.
<em>Vulnerability Management</em>:
We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following
CVSS vector: <code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</code> and assigned CVE
<code>CVE-2024-28830</code>.
------------------------------------<diff>-------------------------------------------
Title: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830)
Class: security
Compatible: incomp
Component: wato
Date: 1718799000
Edition: cre
Level: 2
Version: 2.1.0p45
By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal
monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log.
Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log.
This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of
automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of
the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface.
Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically
during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in
the log (see next paragraph for details).
A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is
- copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong during the update, you
? -----------------------
+ copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong
- have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log and remove the automation
+ during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log
+ and remove the automation secrets manually by running
+
+ ```
+ sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
+ sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
+ ```
+
- secrets manually. If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup
? ------------------
+ If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files.
? +++++++
- files.
In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation
secrets are replaced during the update of each site.
In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no
automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only
information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a
replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be
present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well,
the steps described before also apply.
<em>Affected Versions</em>:
LI: 2.3.0
LI: 2.2.0
LI: 2.1.0
LI: 2.0.0 (EOL)
<em>Mitigations</em>:
Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in
~var/check_mk/wato/log.
<em>Vulnerability Management</em>:
We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following
CVSS vector: <code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</code> and assigned CVE
<code>CVE-2024-28830</code>.
Werk 17056 was adapted. The following is the new Werk, a diff is shown at the end of the message.
Title: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830)
Class: security
Compatible: incomp
Component: wato
Date: 1718799000
Edition: cre
Level: 2
Version: 2.2.0p28
By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal
monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log.
Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log.
This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of
automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of
the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface.
Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically
during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in
the log (see next paragraph for details).
A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is
copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong
during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log
and remove the automation secrets manually by running
```
sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
```
If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files.
In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation
secrets are replaced during the update of each site.
In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no
automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only
information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a
replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be
present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well,
the steps described before also apply.
<em>Affected Versions</em>:
LI: 2.3.0
LI: 2.2.0
LI: 2.1.0
LI: 2.0.0 (EOL)
<em>Mitigations</em>:
Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in
~var/check_mk/wato/log.
<em>Vulnerability Management</em>:
We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following
CVSS vector: <code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</code> and assigned CVE
<code>CVE-2024-28830</code>.
------------------------------------<diff>-------------------------------------------
Title: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830)
Class: security
Compatible: incomp
Component: wato
Date: 1718799000
Edition: cre
Level: 2
Version: 2.2.0p28
By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal
monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log.
Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log.
This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of
automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of
the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface.
Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically
during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in
the log (see next paragraph for details).
A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is
copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong
during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log
- and remove the automation secrets manually. If the update works as expected,
- you can remove the backup files.
+ and remove the automation secrets manually by running
+
+ ```
+ sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
+ sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
+ ```
+
+ If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files.
In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation
secrets are replaced during the update of each site.
In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no
automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only
information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a
replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be
present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well,
the steps described before also apply.
<em>Affected Versions</em>:
LI: 2.3.0
LI: 2.2.0
LI: 2.1.0
LI: 2.0.0 (EOL)
<em>Mitigations</em>:
Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in
~var/check_mk/wato/log.
<em>Vulnerability Management</em>:
We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following
CVSS vector: <code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</code> and assigned CVE
<code>CVE-2024-28830</code>.
[//]: # (werk v2)
# Preserve search term after deletion of topics, bookmarks or custom sidebar elements
key | value
---------- | ---
date | 2024-06-11T09:15:57+00:00
version | 2.3.0p8
class | fix
edition | cre
component | multisite
level | 1
compatible | yes
Recently, deleting topics, bookmarks or custom sidebar elements under "Customize" led to a page reload that ignored a given inpage search ("Find on this page ...").
This is fixed to preserving the search term after deletion.
Werk 17056 was adapted. The following is the new Werk, a diff is shown at the end of the message.
[//]: # (werk v2)
# Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830)
key | value
---------- | ---
date | 2024-06-19T12:10:00+00:00
version | 2.3.0p7
class | security
edition | cre
component | wato
level | 2
compatible | no
By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal
monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log.
Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log.
This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of
automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of
the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface.
Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically
during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in
the log (see next paragraph for details).
A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is
copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong
during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log
and remove the automation secrets manually by running
```
sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
```
If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files.
In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation
secrets are replaced during the update of each site.
In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no
automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only
information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a
replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be
present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well,
the steps described before also apply.
*Affected Versions*:
* 2.3.0
* 2.2.0
* 2.1.0
* 2.0.0 (EOL)
*Mitigations*:
Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in
~var/check_mk/wato/log.
*Vulnerability Management*:
We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following
CVSS vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` and assigned CVE
`CVE-2024-28830`.
------------------------------------<diff>-------------------------------------------
[//]: # (werk v2)
# Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830)
key | value
---------- | ---
date | 2024-06-19T12:10:00+00:00
version | 2.3.0p7
class | security
edition | cre
component | wato
level | 2
compatible | no
By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal
monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log.
Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log.
This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of
automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of
the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface.
Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically
during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in
the log (see next paragraph for details).
A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is
copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong
during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log
- and remove the automation secrets manually. If the update works as expected,
- you can remove the backup files.
+ and remove the automation secrets manually by running
+
+ ```
+ sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
+ sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit*
+ ```
+
+ If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files.
In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation
secrets are replaced during the update of each site.
In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no
automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only
information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a
replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be
present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well,
the steps described before also apply.
*Affected Versions*:
* 2.3.0
* 2.2.0
* 2.1.0
* 2.0.0 (EOL)
*Mitigations*:
Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in
~var/check_mk/wato/log.
*Vulnerability Management*:
We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following
CVSS vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` and assigned CVE
`CVE-2024-28830`.
[//]: # (werk v2)
# More helpful error handling for broken plugins
key | value
---------- | ---
date | 2024-06-22T20:52:10+00:00
version | 2.3.0p8
class | fix
edition | cre
component | checks
level | 1
compatible | yes
This only affects developers of plugins.
In case of a broken import in a plugin the resulting `ImportError` has been swallowed, making debugging very hard.
Now the error is reported on the console (to std error), and raised in debug mode (as is the case for any other exception).