Checkmk werks level1 June 2024

checkmk-werks-lvl1@lists.checkmk.com

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[2.3.0] Checkmk Werk 16434 created: Synthetic Monitoring: Privilege Escalation

by Checkmk werks level 1

[//]: # (werk v2) # Synthetic Monitoring: Privilege Escalation key | value ---------- | --- date | 2024-06-24T14:56:31+00:00 version | 2.3.0p8 class | security edition | cee component | agents level | 1 compatible | yes The Robotmk scheduler was affected by a privilege escalation issue. This issue affects users, which have configured the rule `Robotmk scheduler (Windows)`. Specifically, an attacker is able to exploit the issue, if 1. `Automated environment setup (via RCC)` was configured in the `Robotmk scheduler (Windows)` rule, 2. the same plan was configured without configuring `Execute plan as a specific user` 3. and a user on the host, onto which the scheduler has been deployed, was compromised. In this event, the attacker could gain SYSTEM privileges on the host. If `Execute plan as a specific user` _is_ configured, then the attacker could compromise that specific user, rather than SYSTEM. There is a second similar, but distinct issue. If - there are two or more plans configured with `Execute plan as a specific user` with distinct users - and one of the configured users was already compromised. The attacker could then compromise the other user. *Background*: The Robotmk scheduler is started by the Checkmk agent that runs with SYSTEM privileges. Moreover, Robotmk allows the user to automatically build Python environments via RCC. During setup the scheduler would enable a RCC feature called `shared holotree usage`. This feature allows all users on the host to edit these Python environments. Thus, any compromised user on the host is also able to compromise a user, which executes code from these shared environments. With this Werk, `shared holotree usage` will no longer be enabled. Affected users will have their access to the vunerable Python environments revoked. Moreover, the permissions inside of the working directory of Robotmk have been reworked. Users now only have access to directories, which are required for their own executions. Note, you must update both Checkmk and redeploy the latest Robotmk Scheduler. *Affected Versions*: * 2.3.0 *Mitigations*: If updating is not possible: * Do not use the rule `Automated environment setup (via RCC)`. * Always use the same user for `Execute plan as a specific user`. *Vulnerability Management*: We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of 7.8 (High) with the following CVSS vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` and requested a CVE.

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.3.0] Checkmk Werk 16433 created: Synthetic Monitoring: Report RCC Profile Configuration Errors

by Checkmk werks level 1

[//]: # (werk v2) # Synthetic Monitoring: Report RCC Profile Configuration Errors key | value ---------- | --- date | 2024-06-24T14:12:42+00:00 version | 2.3.0p8 class | fix edition | cee component | checks level | 1 compatible | yes If the Robotmk Scheduler encounters an error while applying the RCC configuration, then corresponding RCC plans will be skipped. This in turn affects discovered services in Checkmk. With this Werk the check `robotmk_scheduler_status` will go CRIT and report the error.

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.4.0] Checkmk Werk 16716 created: Mitigate timing-unsafe comparisons to prevent byte-by-byte brute forcing attack

by Checkmk werks level 1

[//]: # (werk v2) # Mitigate timing-unsafe comparisons to prevent byte-by-byte brute forcing attack key | value ---------- | --- date | 2024-06-25T10:10:15+00:00 version | 2.4.0b1 class | security edition | cee component | agents level | 1 compatible | yes A theorical brute force attack could be performed due to timing-unsafe secrets comparison. This fix changes the way secrets are verified in communication with the agent. To aid automated scanning we assign a CVSS score of 0.0 (None) (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N).

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.4.0] Checkmk Werk 16749 created: Add 'Export this connection for API' to dcd connections

by Checkmk werks level 1

[//]: # (werk v2) # Add 'Export this connection for API' to dcd connections key | value ---------- | --- date | 2024-06-24T13:33:16+00:00 version | 2.4.0b1 class | feature edition | cee component | multisite level | 1 compatible | yes For other rules we have such exporters. If a rule is configured then the rule representation can be displayed via the blue arrow in action buttons.

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.4.0] Checkmk Werk 17057 created: Use correct filter for virtual host tree links

by Checkmk werks level 1

[//]: # (werk v2) # Use correct filter for virtual host tree links key | value ---------- | --- compatible | yes version | 2.4.0b1 date | 2024-06-25T13:24:05+00:00 level | 1 class | fix component | multisite edition | cre Since 2.2.0 the virtual host tree links for "Show the service problems contained in this branch" missed the filters for "service states" (WARN/CRIT/UNKN) and "downtimes" (no).

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.4.0] Checkmk Werk 16434 created: Synthetic Monitoring: Privilege Escalation

by Checkmk werks level 1

[//]: # (werk v2) # Synthetic Monitoring: Privilege Escalation key | value ---------- | --- date | 2024-06-24T14:56:31+00:00 version | 2.4.0b1 class | security edition | cee component | agents level | 1 compatible | yes The Robotmk scheduler was affected by a privilege escalation issue. This issue affects users, which have configured the rule `Robotmk scheduler (Windows)`. Specifically, an attacker is able to exploit the issue, if 1. `Automated environment setup (via RCC)` was configured in the `Robotmk scheduler (Windows)` rule, 2. the same plan was configured without configuring `Execute plan as a specific user` 3. and a user on the host, onto which the scheduler has been deployed, was compromised. In this event, the attacker could gain SYSTEM privileges on the host. If `Execute plan as a specific user` _is_ configured, then the attacker could compromise that specific user, rather than SYSTEM. There is a second similar, but distinct issue. If - there are two or more plans configured with `Execute plan as a specific user` with distinct users - and one of the configured users was already compromised. The attacker could then compromise the other user. *Background*: The Robotmk scheduler is started by the Checkmk agent that runs with SYSTEM privileges. Moreover, Robotmk allows the user to automatically build Python environments via RCC. During setup the scheduler would enable a RCC feature called `shared holotree usage`. This feature allows all users on the host to edit these Python environments. Thus, any compromised user on the host is also able to compromise a user, which executes code from these shared environments. With this Werk, `shared holotree usage` will no longer be enabled. Affected users will have their access to the vunerable Python environments revoked. Moreover, the permissions inside of the working directory of Robotmk have been reworked. Users now only have access to directories, which are required for their own executions. Note, you must update both Checkmk and redeploy the latest Robotmk Scheduler. *Affected Versions*: * 2.3.0 *Mitigations*: If updating is not possible: * Do not use the rule `Automated environment setup (via RCC)`. * Always use the same user for `Execute plan as a specific user`. *Vulnerability Management*: We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of 7.8 (High) with the following CVSS vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` and requested a CVE.

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.4.0] Checkmk Werk 16433 created: Synthetic Monitoring: Report RCC Profile Configuration Errors

by Checkmk werks level 1

[//]: # (werk v2) # Synthetic Monitoring: Report RCC Profile Configuration Errors key | value ---------- | --- date | 2024-06-24T14:12:42+00:00 version | 2.4.0b1 class | fix edition | cee component | checks level | 1 compatible | yes If the Robotmk Scheduler encounters an error while applying the RCC configuration, then corresponding RCC plans will be skipped. This in turn affects discovered services in Checkmk. With this Werk the check `robotmk_scheduler_status` will go CRIT and report the error.

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.1.0] Checkmk Werk 17056 adapted: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830)

by Checkmk werks level 1

Werk 17056 was adapted. The following is the new Werk, a diff is shown at the end of the message. Title: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830) Class: security Compatible: incomp Component: wato Date: 1718799000 Edition: cre Level: 2 Version: 2.1.0p45 By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log. Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log. This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface. Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in the log (see next paragraph for details). A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log and remove the automation secrets manually by running ``` sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit* sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit* ``` If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files. In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation secrets are replaced during the update of each site. In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well, the steps described before also apply. Affected Versions: LI: 2.3.0 LI: 2.2.0 LI: 2.1.0 LI: 2.0.0 (EOL) Mitigations: Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in ~var/check_mk/wato/log. Vulnerability Management: We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following CVSS vector: <code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</code> and assigned CVE <code>CVE-2024-28830</code>. ------------------------------------<diff>------------------------------------------- Title: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830) Class: security Compatible: incomp Component: wato Date: 1718799000 Edition: cre Level: 2 Version: 2.1.0p45 By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log. Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log. This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface. Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in the log (see next paragraph for details). A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is - copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong during the update, you ? ----------------------- + copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong - have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log and remove the automation + during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log + and remove the automation secrets manually by running + + ``` + sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit* + sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit* + ``` + - secrets manually. If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup ? ------------------ + If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files. ? +++++++ - files. In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation secrets are replaced during the update of each site. In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well, the steps described before also apply. Affected Versions: LI: 2.3.0 LI: 2.2.0 LI: 2.1.0 LI: 2.0.0 (EOL) Mitigations: Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in ~var/check_mk/wato/log. Vulnerability Management: We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following CVSS vector: <code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</code> and assigned CVE <code>CVE-2024-28830</code>.

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.2.0] Checkmk Werk 17056 adapted: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830)

by Checkmk werks level 1

Werk 17056 was adapted. The following is the new Werk, a diff is shown at the end of the message. Title: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830) Class: security Compatible: incomp Component: wato Date: 1718799000 Edition: cre Level: 2 Version: 2.2.0p28 By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log. Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log. This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface. Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in the log (see next paragraph for details). A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log and remove the automation secrets manually by running ``` sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit* sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit* ``` If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files. In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation secrets are replaced during the update of each site. In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well, the steps described before also apply. Affected Versions: LI: 2.3.0 LI: 2.2.0 LI: 2.1.0 LI: 2.0.0 (EOL) Mitigations: Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in ~var/check_mk/wato/log. Vulnerability Management: We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following CVSS vector: <code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</code> and assigned CVE <code>CVE-2024-28830</code>. ------------------------------------<diff>------------------------------------------- Title: Don't show automation secret in the audit log (addresses CVE-2024-28830) Class: security Compatible: incomp Component: wato Date: 1718799000 Edition: cre Level: 2 Version: 2.2.0p28 By default only admin users are able to see the audit log. Guests and normal monitoring users do not have acces to the audit log. Werk #13330 already fixed a problem where passwords were shown in the audit log. This werk now addresses the problem, that still automation secrets of automation user were logged in clear text to the audit log, e.g. on change of the automation secret via REST-API or the user interface. Existing automation secrets in the audit log should be removed automatically during the update but please double check that no automation secrets remain in the log (see next paragraph for details). A backup of the original audit log (before automation secrets were removed) is copied to "~/audit_log_backup". If anything goes wrong during the update, you have to copy the files back to ~var/check_mk/wato/log - and remove the automation secrets manually. If the update works as expected, - you can remove the backup files. + and remove the automation secrets manually by running + + ``` + sed -i 's/Value of "automation_secret" changed from "[^"]*" to "[^"]*".\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit* + sed -i 's/Attribute "automation_secret" with value "[^"]*" added.\\n//g' ~/var/check_mk/wato/log/wato_audit* + ``` + + If the update works as expected, you can remove the backup files. In distributed setups which do not replicate the configuration, automation secrets are replaced during the update of each site. In setups which replicate the configuration from central to remote sites no automation secrets should be present in the logs of the remote site, since only information about the activation is logged. Only if you switched to a replicated setup after the upgrade to the 2.0, automation secrets can be present in the logs. Since automation secrets may be in this scenario as well, the steps described before also apply. Affected Versions: LI: 2.3.0 LI: 2.2.0 LI: 2.1.0 LI: 2.0.0 (EOL) Mitigations: Remove automation secrets manually within the files located in ~var/check_mk/wato/log. Vulnerability Management: We have rated the issue with a CVSS Score of <2.7 (Low)> with the following CVSS vector: <code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N</code> and assigned CVE <code>CVE-2024-28830</code>.

2 months, 3 weeks

[2.2.0] Checkmk Werk 17111 created: JVM garbage collectors: Collection time off by factor of 100

by Checkmk werks level 1

Title: JVM garbage collectors: Collection time off by factor of 100 Class: fix Compatible: compat Component: checks Date: 1719228002 Edition: cre Level: 1 Version: 2.2.0p28

2 months, 3 weeks

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Checkmk werks level1 June 2024